Double-Click on This: Keeping Pace with On-Line Market Manipulation by Toross, Nancy
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1999
Double-Click on This: Keeping Pace with On-Line
Market Manipulation
Nancy Toross
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy Toross, Double-Click on This: Keeping Pace with On-Line Market Manipulation, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1399 (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol32/iss4/21
DOUBLE-CLICK1 ON THIS: KEEPING PACE
WITH ON-LINE MARKET MANIPULATION
The goal is simply to prohibit every... device used to persuade
the public that activity in a security is the reflection of a
genuine demand instead of a mirage.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
First there was the telegraph.3 Next came the stock ticker,4 the
telephone,5 and later the television.6 With each invention the speed
1. To "click" means to depress and release the mouse button on a com-
puter. See WEBSTER'S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE DICTIONARY 149 (1997). To
"double-click" means to click the mouse button twice in rapid succession. Ex-
plosive growth in the number of computer users has spawned the development
of numerous new terms which are now part of our common vernacular. For
example, a user selects an item by "clicking" on it and chooses an item by
"double-clicking" on it.
2. S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 54 (1934). In 1941, it was noted that the main
antimanipulation provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act"), section 9(a)(2), was the "very heart of the Act." HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 77TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SEC ON
PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 50 (COMM. Print 1941) [hereinafter SEC
REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS].
3. The modem telegraph resulted from the development of the electro-
magnet in the 1830s. See 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 611
(15th ed. 1988). The electromagnet "provided Samuel Morse with a way to
transmit and receive electric signals." Id. Morse developed the operator key
which, when depressed, "completed an electric circuit and sent a signal to a
distant receiver." Id. Around 1856, a sounding key was developed which en-
abled skilled operators to listen to what the key "said" and transcribe it. See id.
In 1866, a transatlantic telegraph cable was completed, allowing communica-
tion between traders in New York and London. See Suzanne McGee, Stock
Markets May Look Nothing Like They Used To; But They Still Serve the Same
Crucial Role, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1999, at S11.
4. "[T]he stock ticker was developed at the New York Stock Exchange
[("NYSE")] in 1867." 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, at 759.
The high-speed teletype would print the stock symbol, number of shares, and
price of a transaction; this information was then transmitted to tickers at bro-
kerage firms. See id.
5. The telephone is an electrical device invented by Alexander Graham
1399
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1399
with which information could reach the securities markets increased,
investor access to informational resources and market research im-
proved, and transaction costs decreased. 7 Then there was the Inter-
net.8 The emergence of the Internet is revolutionizing societal meth-
ods of communication. 9 As the court in the seminal Internet law case
of ACLU v. Reno1° noted, the Internet is a "unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication."' 1 Never before has a
technology caught on so fast.'2 Currently, World Wide Web13 users
Bell, who patented the technology in March, 1876. See id. at 615. By 1887,
over 150,000 telephones had been installed in the United States. See id.
6. In 1926, Englishman John L. Baird was the first person to demonstrate
a "true television system by electrically transmitting moving pictures." Id. at
617. Today, television plays a significant role in creating the climate in which
stocks are bought and sold: "[T]elevision appearances by any of a variety of
market players can hit the market just as hard as a warning from [Federal Re-
serve Chairman Alan] Greenspan." E.S. Browning, Market Surge Is Being
Powered by New Forces, Investors' Growing Use of Technology Changing the
Rules, ARJz. REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1999, at E2.
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Inter-
net on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195, 1195-96 (1997).
8. The Internet is "a giant network which interconnects innumerable
smaller groups of linked computer networks." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), af'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (describing in detail the
creation, development, operation and private regulation of the Internet). Typi-
cally, a user employs one of two common methods to gain physical access to
the Internet: first, a person may use a computer that is "directly (and usually
permanently) connected to a computer network that is itself directly or indi-
rectly connected to the Internet;" second, a person may use "a 'personal com-
puter' with a 'modem' to connect over a telephone line to a larger computer or
computer network that is itself directly or indirectly connected to the Internet."
Id. at 832. See generally MARGARET LEVINE YOUNG ET AL., INTERNET: THE
COMPLETE REFERENCE, MILLENNIUM EDITION 4-18 (1999) (defining the ba-
sics of Internet access).
9. See generally A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (visited
Apr. 8, 1999) <http://whitehouse.gov/WI-/new/commerce/index.html>.
10. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
11. Id. at 844.
12. See Robert D. Hof, The "Click Here" Economy, BUS. WK., June 22,
1998, at 122.
13. The World Wide Web ("Web") is the most popular and advanced of
three methods used to locate and retrieve information on the Intemet--the other
two being file transfer protocol and a program and format referred to as "go-
pher". See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835-36. The Web uses a formatting lan-
guage called hypertext markup language ("HTML") and allows Web browsers
to display HTML documents containing text, images, sound, animation and
moving video. See id. at 836. Essentially, the Web is a series of documents
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number an estimated 70 million. 14 "It took radio more than 30 years
to reach 60 million people, and television 15 years."'" Worldwide,
the Internet ties together an estimated 159 million users.'
6
Businesses are at the forefront of this revolution.' 7 At an
alarming rate, 18 actual or potential issuers19 and private individuals
are constructing Web sites20 to promote and sell a product, render a
stored in different computers all over the Internet. See id. The Web was cre-
ated to "serve as the platform for a global, online store of knowledge, contain-
ing information from a diversity of resources and accessible to Internet users
around the world." Id. See generally YOUNG, supra note 8, at 390-97 (dis-
cussing the various components of the Web).
14. See Network Solutions (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.netsol.com/
nsi/facts/html> [hereinafter Network Solutions].
15. Hof, supra note 12.
16. See NUA Internet Surveys (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.nua.ie/
surveys/index.cgi>. This figure includes Web users and users who use other
methods of communication or remote information retrieval on the Internet.
For example, users may also communicate through e-mail, listservs, USENET
newsgroups, real-time communication, file transfer protocol, or gopher. See
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834-35.
17. See Hof, supra note 12.
18. Network Solutions, the registrar for all domain names with the .com,
.org and .net top-level domains, had registered 3.4 million sites as of Decem-
ber, 1998. See Network Solutions, supra note 14. In the first quarter of 1998,
340,000 new sites were registered. See id. In the second and third quarters,
the numbers rose to 443,000 and 507,000 new registrations, respectively. See
id. In the fourth quarter of 1998, Network Solutions registered 621,000 new
sites; astoundingly, 1.9 million of the total 3.4 million sites were registered in
1998. See id. Network Solutions had a government-approved monopoly in
registering Internet addresses since 1993; however, the government recently
signed an agreement with Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers, known commonly as ICANN, to spur private competition in the industry.
See John Gibeaut, Staking an Internet Claim, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 82. Con-
sequently, five new companies entered the address registration business in May
1999, and another twenty-nine companies are anticipated by late June 1999.
See id.
19. Generally, the term issuer refers to "every person who issues or pro-
poses to issue any security." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(4), 78c(a)(8) (1994).
20. "A Web site is a collection of Web pages belonging to a particular per-
son or organization." YOUNG, supra note 8, at 394. "A Web page is an
HTML document that is stored on a Web server and that has a [Uniform Re-
source Locator, or URL] so that it can be accessed via the Web." Id. "Typi-
cally, the URLs of these pages share a common prefix, which is the address of
the home page of the site. The home page is the 'front door' of the site, and is
set up to help viewers find whatever is of interest to them on that site." Id.
(emphasis omitted).
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service, or disseminate information. Increasingly, the product ped-
dled is a security.21 The number of Web users is expected to increase
to 477 million by 2002, "with [W]eb pages growing seven-fold to 7.7
billion during the same period.,22 The Internet promises to make the
securities markets more efficient and effective. Approximately three
million people now have on-line trading accounts, a statistic that by
2001 is expected to reach fourteen million.2 3 In even larger numbers,
investors routinely use the Internet's financial forums to seek pro-
spective investments and discuss actual ones.24 According to recent
headlines, it seems like fraud and market manipulation are having no
problem keeping pace.
The Internet has numerous applications, especially for the small
investor, which distinguish it from earlier forms of technological in-
novation.25  The Internet provides not only a useful source of
21. Generally, "[t]he term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest, or participa-
tion in any profit-sharing agreement ...." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l), 78c(a)(10)
(1994). In 1998, an estimated 22 percent of all securities transactions were
conducted on-line compared to virtually no such transactions in 1995. See
United States General Accounting Office, Securities Fraud: The Internet Poses
Challenges to Regulators and Investors: Testimony Before the Permanent
Subcomm. On Investigations, Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong.
at 1 (Mar. 23, 1999) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Associate Director, Fi-
nancial Institutions and Markets Issues, General Government Division) [here-
inafter GAO Testimony].
22. Network Solutions, supra note 14 (citing Internal Data Corporation sta-
tistics).
23. See Michael Schroeder, Growth in Internet Securities Fraud Will Be
Difficult to Combat, GAO Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1999, at C15; Aaron
Lucchetti & Larry Bauman, Small Brokerage Firms Surge on Internet Fever,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1999, at C7.
24. For example, as of February 24, 1999, over eight million "members"
had posted messages to the Silicon Investor's Web site. See Silicon Investor
(visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.techstocks.com/index.html>. In its mis-
sion statement, the self-proclaimed "world's largest financial discussion site"
insists that "[fjinancial information is no longer an exclusive privilege of Wall
Street and its contingent of analysts and brokers. [Silicon Investor] seeks to
bring a new financial order to Wall Street... one that benefits individual in-
vestors." Id. See also Motley Fool (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
<http://www.fool.com>; StockSelector.com (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.stockselector.com>.
25. See generally Coffee, supra note 7 (arguing that the Internet implicates
investor empowerment, market efficiency, statutory obsolescence, disinterme-
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information for most market participants, but an important one.26
The new medium essentially provides individual investors with the
informational resources traditionally available only to market profes-
sionals. The posting of information pertaining to particular securities
on the Internet affects, rather substantially, the way many investors
make financial decisions. 27 A stock's price can be influenced within
minutes of posting information on a newsgroup, a portal's message
board, or, most commonly, on a Web site's message board28 or dis-
cussion forum.29
Unfortunately, along with such technological advances comes
an increased opportunity to manipulate a stock's price over the Inter-
net. Such manipulation injures the legitimate investor and under-
mines the integrity of the securities markets. One form of legal vio-
lation that can result from such a practice is "market manipulation,"
an action related to fraud, "but not altogether part of it as a matter of
legal analysis."30
This Comment addresses the application of the antimanipulation
and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to manipula-
tions that occur through the use of the Internet. Part II briefly ex-
plains the structure of the securities markets. Part HI describes a
classic market manipulation technique-the conventional boiler
room. This part also sets forth the current statutory framework in
place to combat market manipulation of both registered securities
31
diation and fraud, among other things).
26. According to a February, 1998, survey conducted for MSNBC by Mar-
ket Facts, Inc., 53% of domestic Internet users go online for news. See Inter-
netnews.com (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://www.intemetnews.com/bus-
news/article/0,1087,3-19491,00.html>. Research also revealed that the Inter-
net is the preferred medium for accessing financial news, suggesting more at-
work usage for financial news than any other topic. See id.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. A message board is "a portal's private newsgroup universe. It is or-
ganized into topic categories, and within a board the members start new topics
... which can then be replied to by other members." YOUNG, supra note 8, at
562.
29. See Joseph J. Celia III & John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and the
Internet: Meeting the Challenge of the Next Millennium: A Program for the
Eagle and the Internet, 52 BUS. LAW. 815, 825 (1997). See infra Part IV.
30. LOuIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 929 (3d ed. 1995 & 1999 Supp.).
31. Generally, to be legally offered or sold, a security must be registered
pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), unless
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and the over-the-counter ("OTC") market.32  Part IV discusses
emerging forms of on-line market manipulation and explores the
particular susceptibility of thinly capitalized companies. Moreover,
this part provides an overview of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's ("SEC")33 present approach to fighting on-line manipula-
tion-applying established law to a revolutionary medium.
Finally, Part V concludes that, in order to curb the burgeoning
problem of market manipulation on the Internet, the SEC must bol-
ster its surveillance, policing, and enforcement efforts which, at pres-
ent, are struggling to keep pace with the Internet's amazing growth
rate. SEC and other regulatory programs aimed at combatting on-
line fraud and manipulation are still young and face substantial chal-
lenges that may limit their success. Specifically, the programs have
limited investigative staff resources which retard their ability to
promptly and effectively respond to credible fraud tips. Further-
more, the numerous organizations charged with regulating the secu-
rities markets must develop a coherent and coordinated approach to
battling on-line fraud and better educate the investing public about
the risks of investing on-line.
11. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS
At this point it is useful to discuss briefly the structure of the se-
curities markets. Where an issuer's stock is listed dictates the level
of information about a company that must be publicly disclosed be-
fore its shares may be offered to the public. Basically, convention
dictates drawing a distinction between the stock exchanges and the
OTC market. Currently, eight stock exchanges are registered with
the SEC.34 Each exchange has its own requirements for listing, but
the security or transaction qualifies for an exemption. See 15 U.S.C. §§
77c(a),(d) (1994).
32. See infra Part III.B.2.
33. Section 4(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")
created the SEC, an independent federal agency composed of "five commis-
sioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate." See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 50. The SEC has four
operating divisions: Corporate Finance, Enforcement, Investment Manage-
ment, and Market Regulation. See id. at 51.
34. Of the eight exchanges, the NYSE has the highest average daily dollar
volume-$22 billion. See id. at 606.
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all eight generally have similar listing policies.35 Ultimately how-
ever, the main characteristic of an exchange is the centralization of
trading on an exchange floor.
36
In contrast, OTC trading is not centralized at a particular physi-
cal location.37 If a stock is not traded on an exchange, it trades in the
OTC market through dealers38 who become market makers39 in that
security. A subsidiary of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), NASD Regulation, Inc., is the organization
charged with regulating the OTC market.
40
Today, quotations for most OTC equity trading are handled
through the NASDAQ system.4' In order to trade on NASDAQ, a
security must be registered with the SEC pursuant to section 12(g) of
the Exchange Act.42 Recently, NASDAQ has experienced exponen-
tial growth. In 1994, "trading volume exceeded 74.3 billion shares
(more than twice 1990 levels), with a value of $1.45 trillion (three
times 1990 levels)." 43 In the aggregate, trading in NASDAQ stocks
renders it the second largest market in the United States.44 Much of
35. For example, the NYSE requires 1.1 million publicly held shares; 2000
holders of 100 shares or more; an aggregate market value of $18 million for
publicly held shares; and a demonstrated earning power under certain com-
petitive conditions. See id. at 409.
36. See id. at 604.
37. See id. at 617. The OTC market is "[a] widespread aggregation of deal-
ers who make markets in many different securities." DAVID L. ScoTr, WALL
STREET WoRDs 269 (2d ed. 1998). Unlike the exchanges where trading occurs
in one physical location, OTC trading occurs through electronic negotiations
between buyers and sellers. See id.
38. Generally, a dealer is "any person who engages either for all or part of
his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of
offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by
another person." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1994).
39. A market maker is a person or firm who or which continuously "buys
and sells a security for one's own account." SCOTT, supra note 37, at 227.
"[D]ealers in the over-the-counter market are market makers." Id.
40. See id. at 244.
41. See id. at 243.
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994).
43. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 620.
44. See id.
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this growth can be attributed to recent technological advances, par-
ticularly "automated order routing and execution functions. 45
If a publicly traded company does not meet NASDAQ or ex-
change listing requirements, its shares are bought and sold over-the-
counter.46 Previously, price quotes for shares of these OTC compa-
nies, generally referred to as penny stocks,47 were reported exclu-
sively in daily "pink sheets" 48 published for broker-dealers by a pri-
vate corporation, the National Quotations Bureau. Today, pink
sheets are being replaced by the computerized OTC Bulletin Board49
operated by NASDAQ. The OTC Bulletin Board displays real-time
quotes and last sale prices for nearly 6,000 companies.50 However,
in contrast to the exchanges or NASDAQ, these OTC companies are
not subject to any financial reporting or disclosure requirements
prior to inclusion on the OTC Bulletin Board. In other words, an in-
vestor will not be able to obtain any type of reliable information on
the issuer, its business, or the particular securities issue.
The term "micro cap" generally refers to the stock of any com-
pany with comparatively low capitalization, regardless of its price
and where it is traded.51 The category of micro cap stocks is broader
45. SEC, Report to Congress: Impact of Recent Technological Advances on
the Securities Markets (1997) available in Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm>
[hereinafter SEC Report].
46. See id.
47. Generally, a penny stock is defined as an equity security not listed on
NASDAQ or a national exchange and either 1) has a price per share of less
than $5; or 2) the issuer has net tangible assets of less than $2 million, if the
issuer has been in continuous operation for at least three years; or which are
less than $5 million, if the issuer has been in continuous operation for less than
three years; or whose average revenues are less than $6 million for the last
three years. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(51)(A) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a51-l
(1996).
48. Pink sheets are the daily sheets which contain "wholesale price quota-
tions for thousands of over-the-counter stocks as listed by dealers who act as
market makers in the individual securities." SCOTr, supra note 37, at 279.
49. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 618.
50. See SEC Report, supra note 45.
51. See Concerning Fraud in the "Micro Cap" Market: Before the Perma-
nent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Governmental Affairs, at 3-4 n.1
(testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) available in Securities and Ex-
change Commission, News (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/tstyl497.txt> [hereinafter Fraud in the Micro Cap Market].
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than the penny stock classification. Thus, the term micro cap in-
cludes penny stocks. Most, if not all, micro cap stocks are quoted on
NASDAQ's OTC Bulletin Board, in the pink sheets, and on the
NASDAQ Small Cap Market.52 The huge increase in public partici-
pation in the securities markets, coupled with increasing Internet use,
provides an increased opportunity to manipulate and abuse market
prices of such stocks. Micro cap shares are especially prone to ma-
nipulation because little, if any, information exists about the issuers.
The investors who purchase such stock tend to be unsophisticated;
therefore, it is probable that broker-dealers, issuers and promoters
can successfully manipulate micro cap stocks without much suspi-
cion. The result is unfortunate-corporate insiders or affiliates get
rich quick while innocent investors lose their money.
III. CLASSIC MARKET MANIPULATION
A. Traditional Manipulative Conduct
Generally, and as defined under the federal securities laws, mar-
ket manipulation means "intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting
the price of securities." 53 However, the crime is not limited to cer-
tain deceitful practices. Practices which create the false impression
that certain market activity is occurring-when in fact such activity
is unrelated to actual supply and demand-are manipulative; clearly,
tampering with the stock price itself is also manipulative.
54
Even before securities laws were enacted, courts at common law
honored the principle that the proper functioning of a securities ex-
change depends on the existence of a free market.55 In United States
The federal securities laws do not define the term "micro cap," but Lipper
Analytical Services classifies companies with market capitalizations of less
than $300 million as micro caps. See id.
52. See id. at 3 n.4.
53. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); see also Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1997) ("[M]anipulation refers
generally to practices... that are intended to mislead investors by artificially
affecting market activity.").
54. See Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360
(N.D. Tex. 1979).
55. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 1531.
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v. Brown,5 6 Judge Woolsey clearly articulated the free market con-
cept:
When an outsider, a member of the public, reads the price
quotations of a stock listed on an exchange, he is justified in
supposing that the quoted price is an appraisal of the value
of that stock due to a series of actual sales between various
persons dealing at arm's length in a free and open market
on the exchange, and so represents a true chancering of the
market value of that stock thereon under the process of at-
trition due to supply operating against demand.57
The classic characteristic of most market manipulations is "be-
havior that has the effect of artificially distorting the market price of
the stock in question, typically by appeals to the speculative impulses
of other investors."58 This statement is premised on the assumption
that market prices and trading behavior are themselves items of ma-
terial information that investors use to make "buy" or "sell" deci-
sions.59 Essentially, it is the "economic function of a securities ex-
change that it be a free market-free of the artificiality of
manipulation." 60 Thus, provisions of the Exchange Act prohibiting
market manipulation reflect Congress's desire to assure the integrity
of market price information.
61
Congress passed the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
largely in response to market manipulation and deceitful practices in
the early part of the twentieth century. 62 In the early 1930s, Senate
56. 5 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), af'd on other grounds, 79 F.2d 321 (2d
Cir. 1935), cert. denied sub nom., McCarthy v. United States, 296 U.S. 650
(1935).
57. Brown, 5 F. Supp. at 85.
58. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 656 (2d ed. 1997).
59. See id.
60. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 930.
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994), which states:
[T]ransactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected with a national
public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and
control of such transactions ... , including [the imposition of] re-
quirements necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably
complete and effective, in order to... insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets in such transactions.
62. See Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Con-
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investigations into the securities markets revealed an increase in
"pool" operations where investors would pump up stock prices
through a series of well-timed purchases, then unload their holdings
on the unsuspecting public before prices dropped.63
The SEC found further signs of market manipulation when the
traditional boiler room.64 became a concern in the late 1950s, after the
SEC became aware of a large number of such operations springing
up around the country.65 Describing the practice as a "selling
methodi which represent[s] the antithesis of fair dealing," the SEC
noted that such selling techniques were not "conducive to an unhur-
ried, informed and careful consideration of the investment factors
applicable to the securities involved."66
Mainly using telephone technology, boiler rooms usually em-
ploy broker-dealers who use high-pressure tactics. Such operations
fall under
the ban of the fraud provisions on alternate theories: (1)
because those provisions "contemplate, at the least, that
recommendations of a security made to proposed purchas-
ers shall have a reasonable basis and that they shall be ac-
companied by disclosure of known or easily ascertainable
facts bearing upon the justification for the representations,"
and (2) because of the failure to disclose to customers "the
lack of adequate financial information or caution them as to
the risk involved in purchasing the stock without such in-
formation."
67
trol Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 691-97 (1986).
63. See id. at 696.
64. A typical boiler room operation involves dozens of salespeople packed
into a room, sitting at banks of telephones, and making hundreds of unsolicited
"cold" calls a day to potential customers. See Marcy Gordon, "Boiler Room"
Investment Scams Targeted by States, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 24, 1998,
at C3. Despite the emergence of the Internet, traditional boiler rooms still exist
and continue to thrive. See id.
65. See Proposed Rule X-15C2-6 under Securities Exchange Act, Exchange
Act Release No. 6885, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,862, at 81,200-01 n.2 (Aug. 16, 1962) (quoting Mac Robbins & Co., Ex-
change Act Release No. 6846 [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 76,853, at 81,166-67 (July 11, 1962)).
66. Id.
67. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 896-97 (quoting Feeney v. SEC,
564 F.2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978)).
1409June 1999]
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B. Applicable Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws
In the area of market manipulation, Congress did not mean to
derogate from the common law by enacting federal statutes. The
purpose of these statutes "has been to give a greater degree of
definiteness to the concept of manipulation and to supply an en-
forcement and preventive mechanism." 68 The statutory scheme de-
veloped through fraud theories borrowed from the common law; the
open market concept developed through English and American
common law.
69
The basic antifraud provisions, section 17(a) of the Securities
Act7 ° and sections 10(b) and 15(c) of the Exchange Act,71 have been
used to combat certain manipulative practices. Section 17(a), long
termed the "grandfather" of all antifraud provisions, creates three dif-
ferent offenses:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of
any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.
72
68. Id. at 934-35.
69. See id. at 935.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa(1994).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994). Section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act
prohibits broker-dealers from making use of interstate commerce "to effect any
transaction in, or induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any secu-
rity otherwise than on a national securities exchange of which it is a member
by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or con-
trivance." 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)(A) (1994). This statute is limited to broker-
dealer over-the-counter transactions.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994).
1410
ON-LINE MARKETMANIPULATION
The provisions actually use the word "manipulative," which the
Supreme Court has noted is a virtual "term of art," reflecting Con-
gress's intention "to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that
might be used to manipulate securities prices."73 Thus, section 9 of
the Exchange Act, outlined below, is supplemented by section
10(b), 74 and rules 10b-5 75 and lOb-1 76 promulgated thereunder,
which may have applicability in a market manipulation case. Section
10(b) makes it unlawful to
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors.
77
Extensive hearings preceded passage of the Exchange Act. The
most relevant discussion of the provision that later became section
10(b) described the section as a "catchall" provision which would
allow the SEC to "deal with new manipulative devices." 78 However,
conduct such as filing false financial reports, issuing misleading
press releases, or insider trading is not necessarily manipulative even
though it may have caused the price of a security to change or may
have violated some other securities law.79 Rather, "[m]anipulative
conduct consists of 'practices ... intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity."'
80
73. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-1 (1998).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
78. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1976) (citing
Hearings on HA 7852 and 8720 Before the House Comm. On Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1974) (statement of Thomas G. Concoran,
spokesman for the drafters of what became § 10(b))).
79. See Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1360
(N.D. Tex. 1979).
80. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. at 476.)
June 1999] 1411
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1399
1. Manipulation of the securities exchanges
A number of Exchange Act sections, discussed below, prohibit
market manipulation through the dissemination of false or mislead-
ing information. These laws can be used to prosecute issuers or
other third parties who have manipulated market prices by posting
false information on the Internet.
Section 9(a)(1) prohibits "wash sales" and matched orders; in
essence, transactions where the same person-or an affiliate-is for
all practical purposes both purchaser and seller so that the sale only
has the appearance of a bona fide transaction. 81 A pool of inves-
tors-probably insiders-can engage in a series of wash sales at pro-
gressively higher prices, hoping to lure investors to purchase the
stock in response to an illusion that the price is on a steady upward
trend. Then, as can be expected, the pool of investors can dump the
stock.
The broadest prohibition against market manipulation appears in
section 9(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for any person
[t]o effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series
of transactions in any security registered on a national secu-
rities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading in
such a security or raising or depressing the price of such se-
curity, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of
such security by others.
82
Effectively, section 9(a)(2) acts as a catch-all prohibition. The
purpose of section 9(a)(2), "the very heart of the Act,"83 is to prohibit
every "device used to persuade the public that activity in a security is
the reflection of a genuine demand instead of a mirage." 84 In es-
sence, manipulation is a form of deception because a person "who
purchases or sells securities for the purpose of inducing other persons
to trade is necessarily deceiving those persons into believing that the
manipulator's purchases or sales are a bona fide expression of supply
and demand in the market... ,,85
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (1994).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
83. SEC REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS, supra note 2.
84. Id. at 54.
85. Poser, supra note 62, at 704.
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The first element of a violation under section 9(a)(2) requires
that one who initiates a transaction "effect" it.86 Also, the "series"
requirement is satisfied by as few as three purchases, 87 or perhaps
even two may suffice. The term "transaction" has been interpreted to
broaden the scope from mere purchases or sales; in an auction mar-
ket, the placing of bids, even if never met by sellers, "may be as ef-
fective an influence on price as a completed sale" because the result
forces bidders to raise their bids.
88
A showing that one has created either actual or apparent trading
activity or raised or depressed the stock price satisfies the second
element of a section 9(a)(2). 9 It is apparent from case law that a
price change is required, albeit that a small price change may suf-
fice.
90
The third, final, and most burdensome evidentiary element of
section 9(a)(2) involves the requirement of showing apurpose to in-
duce others to buy or sell. The SEC has said that because "it is im-
possible to probe into the depths of a man's mind, it is necessary in
the usual case.., that the finding of manipulative purpose be based
on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence." 91 In other
words, motive to manipulate plus a series of transactions establishes
a prima facie showing of purpose and shifts the burden to the defen-
dant.92
The decision to create an express civil cause of action in section
9(e) demonstrates that Congress was concerned with the practices
prohibited in section 9(a)(2). Section 9(e) authorizes any person who
purchases a security at a price that is affected by conduct in violation
of section 9(a) to sue any person who "willfully participates. 93 If
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
87. See Kidder, Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559 (1945).
88. Id.
89. See United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 850 (2d Cir. 1972).
90. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 939 (citing Stein, 456 F.2d at
846).
91. Federal Corp., 25 S.E.C. 227 (1947); see generally Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390-91 n.30 (1983) (noting that proof of scienter
from circumstantial evidence is permitted).
92. See Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins.
Co., 606 F.2d 602, 616 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1994).
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market manipulation occurs for investment purposes, i.e., where the
investor has not acted for the "purpose of inducing the purchase or
sale of such security by others,",94 but has driven the stock price up in
order to dump his or her own shares, it is arguable whether section
9(a)(2) will apply. In such an instance, the investor can be prose-
cuted under Rule 1Ob-5.95
Even in 9(a)(2) cases, the SEC usually takes the extra step and
proves nondisclosure in order to bring the manipulation within con-
ventional fraud theories. 96 In fact, the SEC began de-emphasizing
the section 9(a)(2) approach in the late 1950s, although it was never
abandoned.97 However, even in instances where application of sec-
tion 9 is proper, the SEC and the courts have held that the antifraud
provisions are also violated when securities are sold at manipulated
prices without disclosure of the manipulation.9 8 Such was the case in
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
95. See United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368-72 (2d Cir. 1991).
Moreover, section 9(a)(3) addresses indirect manipulation by third parties,
such as agents paid by market participants, who manipulate stock prices by
broadcasting false or misleading information. This section specifically makes
it unlawful for a dealer or broker, or other person selling or offering for sale or
purchasing or offering to purchase the security, to induce the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange by the circulation
or dissemination in the ordinary course of business of information to the effect
that the price of any such security will or is likely to rise or fall because of
market operations of any one or more persons conducted for the purpose of
raising or depressing the prices of such security. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3)
(1994).
Furthermore, section 9(a)(4) prohibits brokers, dealers, or other persons
selling or offering for sale, or purchasing or offering to purchase, a nationally
registered security from inducing the purchase or sale by means of any state-
ment that was, in light of surrounding circumstances, "false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, and which he knew or had reasonable ground to
believe was so false and misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1994). This
practice of spreading rumors or paying someone else to "tout" the stock when
the broker, dealer or other offeror is trying to unload it has, as its only objec-
tive, the goal of fueling investor enthusiasm. See Poser, supra note 62, at 696.
Section 9(a)(5) makes it equally unlawful for any person to induce the
purchase or sale of a registered security for consideration received from a bro-
ker or dealer or from any other person selling or buying, or offering to sell or
buy, a registered security. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(5) (1994).
96. See id.
97. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 944.
98. See id. at 943.
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Barrett & Co., where the SEC strengthened its holding through a ref-
erence to previous decisions where such nondisclosure constituted
omission of a material fact and fraud on the purchasers.
99
In October 1988, the SEC announced that it would form a task
force on penny stock manipulation, which at the time had become a
more "widespread abuse in the marketplace."' l° Interestingly, and at
around the same time, the SEC initiated a series of significant regis-
tered stock manipulation cases against Boyd L. Jefferies,' l Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc.,102 and Michael Milken, 10 3 among others.
Clearly, market manipulation under section 9(a)(2) is not a statutory
dinosaur, even if its muscles are rarely flexed.
2. Manipulation of the over-the-counter market
Unlike the section 9 provisions enacted by Congress to regulate
manipulation of registered securities, 104 the only statutory bases for
attacking manipulation of unregistered securities are the general
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act,105 together with section 17
of the Act.106 Regardless, the SEC has attempted to put over-the-
counter manipulation on the same level as manipulation of the ex-
change markets. In Barrett & Co.,10 7 the SEC concluded that there is
no reasonable distinction... between manipulation of over-
the-counter prices and manipulation of prices on a national
securities exchange, and that both are condemned as
fraudulent by the Securities Exchange Act and, in fact, were
fraudulent at common law .... We believe that the Secu-
rities Exchange Act contemplates that Section 15(c)(1) af-
fords to the over-the-counter market at least as great a
99. See Barrett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328 (1941).
100. William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Market Manipulation, 22
REv. OF SEC. & COMMODmIEs REG. 103, 103 (1989).
101. See SEC v. Jefferies, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,171 (Mar. 19,
1987).
102. See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,474 (June 20, 1989).
103. See SEC v. Milken, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,200 (Apr. 24, 1990).
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (1994). The text of § 9 expressly renders § 9(a)
inapplicable to federally exempted securities. See id.
105. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) (1994).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1994).
107. 9 S.E.C. 319 (1941).
June 1999] 1415
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1399
degree of protection against manipulation or attempted
control as is afforded to the exchange market by Section
9(a).
0 8
Where application of the antifraud provisions is supplementary
to section 9(a)(2) cases, sections 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
17(a) of the Act are essential in over-the-counter cases where section
9 is inapplicable. 0 9 Yet, section 17(a) of the Act and sections 9(a)
and 15(c) of the Exchange Act leave the following two gaps: fraud
in apurchase unless effected by a broker-dealer over-the-counter, or
by any person buying a registered security for the purpose of induc-
ing its purchase by others." 
0
Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b), borrows the lan-
guage of section 17(a), except for the reference to obtaining money
or property and the substitution of "act" for 17(a)'s "transaction,"
and applies that language "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security":
111
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of a national secu-
rities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 112
108. Id.
109. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 30, at 944.
110. See id. at 778.
111. See id. at 748.
112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
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IV. THE INTERNET: A NEW MEDIUM FOR MARKET MANIPULATION
A. On-line Manipulative Conduct
Although market manipulation was a phenomenon of the early
part of the century, it has spread in unprecedented ways with the
emergence of the Internet. Unlike traditional boiler rooms where
perpetrators are usually unscrupulous brokerage firms, 113 the Internet
introduces a greater opportunity for other market participants to be-
come involved in the practice of market manipulation. The Internet
offers manipulators ready access to on-line newsletters, bulletin
boards, chat rooms, and e-mail, all of which make the execution of
market manipulation easier than ever before. This fact is evidenced
in the numerous instances of on-line market manipulation discussed
below.
The Internet delivers both economic and informational advan-
tages and, almost inevitably, disadvantages. Although the benefits of
a global market undoubtedly outweigh the burdens, the Internet
brings an increased opportunity for exploitation. For example, de-
spite the fact that the Internet offers issuers an enhanced ability to
raise capital in a cost efficient manner, it also makes it easier for is-
suers, broker-dealers, or other persons, to manipulate stock prices
and remain undetected. 114 Today, both short- and long-term inves-
tors can easily reach market participants worldwide and use false in-
formation in an attempt to manipulate stock prices.
Most Internet users have user names, 115 pseudonyms that allow
users a distinct on-line identity and permit them to preserve their
anonymity and privacy. A user name or e-mail address1 6 is usually
113. See Perry W. Jost, Letting the Steam Out of Boiler Room Operations:
Added Restrictions on Broker-Dealer Penny Stock Recommendations Imposed
Under New SEC "Cold Calling" Rule 15c2-6, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 727, 727
(1991).
114. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1201.
115. To connect to the Internet a person needs to choose an Internet service
provider ("ISP"). See YOUNG, supra note 8, at 14. The ISP then requires that
the person choose a user name, which is usually comprised of any combination
of a person's name or initials. See id. at 16. Some users, however, choose
"fanciful" names or names that relate to hobbies or interests. Id.
116. An e-mail address consists of the user name and the host domain name,
i.e., the name of a computer owned by a company or Internet service, joined by
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the only on-line indicator of a user's identity. It follows that, with
relative ease, unscrupulous investors can make messages which
contain false information look real and credible; moreover, a user
who employs one of the following methods can render misleading
messages virtually untraceable. Such an act is within the capacity of
even novice Internet users. In particular, but by no means exclu-
sively, unscrupulous promoters may use the following two proven
methods to fool the legitimate investor.
First, users may disguise their true identities by false pretense or
anonymity.' 17 For example, by pretending to be a company insider
when in actuality the user is a short term investor in the company's
stock, the user can disguise his or her identity and post false or inac-
curate information on the Internet to artificially hype the stock." 8
"In the more sophisticated instance, the user sends postings via a
'remailer' or other 'anonymizing' tool, which provides anonymous
email addresses to users who wish to hide their true identities."
119
With little effort and minimal expense, anonymizing tools delete the
identifying information from message headers, 120 thereby defeating
the possibility of tracing a message to its point of origin.
12 1
The second method, commonly known as "spoofing," entails
altering or falsifying e-mails.122 By using a real person's identity or
user identification for the purpose of impersonation, an imposter can
read and alter that person's e-mail or newsgroup posting. 2 3 As is
commonly understood, the Internet is far from private. 24 This fact is
evidenced by the availability of "packet sniffer" programs that
the "at" sign (@). See id. at 104.
117. See Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 826.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Message headers are the electronic equivalent of envelopes. Headers
include the electronic addresses of the recipient and sender, the date and time
the message was sent, and other descriptive information about the message.
See YOUNG, supra note 8, at 106-07.
121. See Cella & Stark, supra note 29, at 826.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. The Internet also raises privacy issues, which are beyond the scope of
this Comment. For a comprehensive overview of possible on-line privacy is-
sues see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Privacy Online: A Report to Con-
gress, June, 1998, available in Federal Trade Commission, Reports (visited
Jan. 25, 1999) <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toe.htm>.
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intercept passwords typed in by users. 12 5 Programs that monitor key-
strokes-the on-line equivalent of wire-tapping a phone line-allow
a "cracker" 126 to deduce identifying information and forge messages
that appear to be from someone else. 2 7 Armed with such informa-
tion, an unscrupulous user may, for example, create a posting that is
seemingly authored by a public company officer in order to manipu-
late the company's stock. Ostensibly, an investor may recognize the
named author of a particular posting and trust the information con-
tained therein as accurate; however, the author of the posting may
not actually be the purported company official but rather an impostor
attempting to manipulate the stock price.
128
Clearly, a manipulator can reach a much larger audience via the
Internet than by working a telephone in a traditional boiler room.
"Whereas the traditional 'boiler room' promoter might reach several
hundred customers through fraudulent phone calls and/or mailings,
the fraudulent promoter on the Internet might reach tens of thou-
sands-and at virtually no cost."'
129
SEC enforcement officials actively monitor the Internet's vari-
ous forums for any indication of market manipulation. 3 ° In theory,
market manipulation on the Internet should be more easily detectable
than through the telephone, which limits the SEC's ability to catch
the classic boiler room promoter to situations where an injured vic-
tim complains after the harm is inflicted. However, special problems
arise when market manipulation occurs on the Internet.
First, the promoter can hide his or her identity on the Internet
and make statements on an anonymous or false basis, thus making it
difficult to identify and prosecute the actual wrongdoer. Second, the
manipulative statement can originate outside the United States, be-
yond the SEC's reach.1
3 '
125. See Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 826.
126. A cracker, as opposed to a hacker whose entire life is immersed in
computing, is one who focuses on illegal computer activity. See DANIEL P.
DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 378 (1994).
127. See Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 826.
128. See id. at 826-27.
129. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1223.
130. See infra Part IV.
131. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1201-02.
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One particular characteristic of the Internet as a medium for dis-
seminating information is that it can give a legitimate appearance to
otherwise illegitimate information. 132 The Internet allows manipu-
lators who have set up Web sites or bulletin boards to establish elec-
tronic links through which users can access previously published le-
gitimate material. The manipulator thereby increases his or her
credibility by associating the Web site or bulletin board with legiti-
mate information, such as reports and other well-recognized periodi-
cal information. For instance, on April 7, 1999, an anonymous user
posted a false message on a bulletin board and provided a link to a
site that looked like that of Bloomberg News. 133 Indeed, the Internet
"even allows a site-holder to link a Web page with a Web page pre-
pared by a regulator."'
134
The new "cyber ' 135 boiler rooms allow scam artists to conduct
sophisticated market manipulations at almost no cost over the Inter-
net from the comfort of their own homes. In four easy steps, a ma-
nipulator can consummate the entire fraud. 136 The first step is to set
up a site or home page where potential investors can find out about
the issuer. 137 In step two, the manipulator, using bulk e-mail or a
132. See International Organization of Securities Commissions, Report on
Enforcement Issues Raised by the Increasing Use of Electronic Networks in the
Securities and Futures Field, B-1037 P.L.I. CoRP. L. & PRAc. 225, 227
(1998).
133. See Jonathan Gaw, Internet Hoax Sends O.C. Tech Stock Up 31%, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1999, at Al. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
134. International Organization of Securities Commissions, supra note 132,
at 228.
135. Coined by science fiction writer William Gibson and now part of the
common vernacular, "cyberspace" describes the world of electronic communi-
cations. See WILLIAM GIBsoN, NEUROMANCER 4 (1984). The term is also
used as an adjective and "has attained such exalted pop culture status that it has
spawned new derivative terms: cyberchat, cyberphobia, cybersex." Sam
Puathasnanon, Cyberspace and Personal Jurisdiction: The Problem of Using
Internet Contacts to Establish Minimum Contacts, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 691,
691 (1998).
136. See John Reed Stark, Tombstones: The Internet's Impact Upon SEC
Rules ofEngagement, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1998, at 10.
137. See id. Web space can be allocated to the manipulator for free by most
Internet service providers. With graphics, sound, and video downloaded from
the Internet, the manipulator can easily post a wide range of phony financial
statements and information that lure investors into purchasing securities. See
id.
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spamming program, personally contacts potential investors regarding
an investment opportunity.1 38 In step three, the manipulator begins a
"buzz" about the issuer and its shares by posting false information to
bulletin boards, newsgroups, and discussion forums.139  Finally, in
step four, the manipulator strengthens the buzz by employing an
Internet investment newsletter. 40 It is that easy to hype the stock,
and easier still to sell the stock back into the exchanges or over-the-
counter markets at a profit and reap the financial rewards of having
inflated the stock price.
B. Susceptibility of Micro Cap Stocks
Smaller companies' stocks, trading in a less than fully efficient
market, are uniquely vulnerable to rumors and price manipulation.
John Reed Stark, Chief of the SEC's new Office of Internet En-
forcement ("OI"), has noted that many of the complaints fielded by
the SEC regard small, often speculative companies whose shares are
quoted on the OTC bulletin board.141 Often, shares of small cap' 42
companies which have a small public float of available shares and
low prices are prime targets for "pump-and-dump" schemes.
43
Most micro cap stocks are exempt from federal registration re-
quirements. As such, these securities are traded over-the-counter and
a limited number of brokers control the market. 44 In the past, regis-
tered brokers peddled such stocks; today, micro cap stocks are
138. See id. at 11. The manipulator can use a "mining" or "extractor" pro-
gram that automatically collects e-mail addresses from all over the Internet to
compile a list of users who will receive the sparn. See id.
139. See id. The manipulator can also respond to his or her own postings
under different user names to create the illusion that people are carrying on the
discussion. See id.
140. See id. The manipulator can personally construct the newsletter to tout
the stock or bribe an unscrupulous online investment newsletter to feature the
issuer's stock. See id.
141. See Jason Anders, Consider the Source, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1998, at
R16.
142. A small cap company is one with "a relatively small number of shares
outstanding. The stock of [small cap companies] tends to have volatile market
prices." The term "small cap" is often used interchangeably with the term
"micro cap." See SCOTT, supra note 37, at 352-53.
143. See Anders, supra note 141; see discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
144. See Fraud in the Micro Cap Market, supra note 51, at 6.
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increasingly being touted on-line by promoters paid by the issuer.
145
Typically, company promoters and often issuer insiders hold large
amounts of stock and profit substantially when stock prices rise after
intense touting. 1
46
In October 1998, recognizing the susceptibility of small issues,
the SEC charged forty-four companies and individuals for illegally
touting small company stocks on-line.' 47 In its first Internet securi-
ties fraud "sweep," the SEC filed twenty-three enforcement actions
against the forty-four stock promoters, Web site operators, and
newsletter publishers who violated the securities laws through use of
spain, on-line newsletters, message boards, and Web sites. Most de-
fendants misrepresented companies' prospects and failed to disclose
that they were being compensated by issuers to tout the stock. 148 The
stock prices of more than 235 micro cap companies were affected by
the alleged illegal activity.1
49
Commenting on the "Internet cases," SEC Enforcement Chief
Richard Walker said that traditional, penny stock, boiler room op-
erators have traded cold calling for cyberspace and that the new ac-
tions and complaints are aimed at sending a message to the unscru-
pulous.
150
There is a fine line between lawful stock promoting and fraud.
In the Internet cases, "[p]romoters often presented company infor-
mation as unbiased research and issued enthusiastic 'buy' recom-
mendations without disclosing that they received cash and stock for
their services.' 151 Arguably, the SEC's first sweep of on-line fraud
was intended to have a deterrent effect on would-be manipulators.
In February 1999, the SEC continued its crackdown on Internet
securities fraud and charged another thirteen defendants with misrep-
resenting the prospects of fifty-six companies in a second round of
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See Michael Schroeder & Rebecca Buckman, U.S. Attacks Stock Fraud
on Internet: SEC Hits Promoters Touting Small Issues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
1998, at Cl.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
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enforcement activity. 152 In its latest sweep, in May 1999, the SEC
accused twenty-six companies and individuals for illegally offering
unregistered securities on-line.153 After these three Internet fraud
sweeps, it is apparent that SEC strategy is to bring actions simultane-
ously in order to reap the maximum amount of publicity to the
agency's enforcement efforts. 154  The SEC has increased surveil-
lance; however, SEC officials have stated that the public should not
be stunned if on-line fraud continues because the agency cannot be
expected to stamp it out.
155
1. On-line newsletters
Hundreds of investment newsletters have appeared virtually
overnight on the Internet. 156 Many such publications are legitimate,
do not charge a fee for offering seemingly unbiased information to
investors, 157 and provide insight into featured companies and rec-
ommend "stock picks of the month."' 58 )While such information may
play an arguably valuable role in investment decisions, some on-line
newsletters are tools for manipulative activity. 159
Some companies pay promoters in cash or securities to recom-
mend the company's stock in on-line newsletters. Although the
practice is legal, federal law requires promoters who tout stock in a
newsletter to disclose the fact of payment and the amount.
160
152. See Michael Schroeder & Rebecca Buckman, SEC Cracks Down on
Internet Securities Deals, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1999, at C1.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. (quoting Richard Walker, director of the SEC's enforcement di-
vision).
156. See Internet Fraud: Tips for Checking Out Newsletters (last modified
Oct. 27, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/newslchk.htm> [hereinafter
Tips].
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., The Future Superstock (visited Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.futuresuperstock.com>.
159. See Internet Fraud: How to Avoid Internet Investment Scams (last
modified Dec. 17, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/consumer/cyberfr.htm> [herein-
after Scams].
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1994). Section 77q(b) of the Securities Act of
1933 makes it "unlawful for any person... to publish.., or circulate any no-
tice, circular, advertisement... or communication which... describes [a] se-
curity for a consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly,
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However, many promoters fail to disclose the requisite informa-
tion.
161
The SEC has brought many cases where the issuer had experi-
enced a lot of "Usenet hype," the seminal Internet market manipula-
tion case being SEC v. Charles 0. Huttoe.162 Huttoe is a prime ex-
ample of the classic "pump-and-dump' ' 163 scheme where owners of
thinly traded stocks pumped up demand for shares through on-line
newsletters, chat rooms, and bulletin boards, and then sold the shares
at inflated prices. Once the manipulators sell off their shares and
stop hyping the stock, the price falls and innocent investors lose
money. 6 This scam is easily analogized as a high-tech version of
the penny stock boiler room. This manipulative scheme is often used
with small, thinly traded companies because it is easier to manipulate
a stock when there is little or no information available about the
company. Moreover, the opportunity to manipulate stock prices in-
creases with the anonymity Internet communication allows; thus,
ruthless promoters can more easily "pump-and-dump" stocks.
Huttoe was the chairman of the board and chief executive offi-
cer of Systems of Excellence ("SOE"), a manufacturer and distribu-
tor of video teleconferencing equipment. 165 Huttoe distributed mil-
lions of SOE shares to other corporations and family members,
from an issuer... without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or pro-
spective, of such consideration and the amount thereof." Id.
161. See Schroeder & Buckman, supra note 152 (reporting the SEC accused
44 companies of "not fully disclosing that they were being paid by the compa-
nies to tout their stocks over the Internet.").
162. SEC, Litigation Release No. 15153, Nov. 7, 1996 (visited Apr. 9, 1999)
<http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lrl5153.txt>. The defendant consented to
entry of a final judgment of permanent injunction prohibiting him from violat-
ing section 17(a) of the Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, among
other things. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 15571, Nov. 25, 1997 (visited
Apr. 9,1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr15571 .txt>.
163. The signature characteristic of a classic pump-and-dump scheme is a
sharp rise in the stock's price and volume followed by a steady decline. See
Portrait of a "Pump-and-Dump" (visited Feb. 16, 1999)
<http://www.stockdetective.com/pumpndump.asp>. "Smaller stocks are par-
ticularly susceptible to market manipulation by corporate insiders and affiliated
parties." Id. Usually, unsuspecting investors are lured into purchasing thinly
traded, inexpensive stocks through promotions disguised as legitimate, unbi-
ased research with a stated or implicit "buy" recommendation. See id.
164. See Scams, supra note 159.
165. See Litigation Release No. 15153, supra note 162.
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manipulated the trading market by issuing materially false and mis-
leading press releases about SOE and its business, and finally sold
his shares into the inflated market. 166 The electronic releases an-
nounced, among other things, nonexistent "multimillion-dollar sales
of SOE products, an acquisition that had not occurred, and false
revenue projections for the business."'167 As a result, the defendants
allegedly obtained over $10 million in illegal proceeds.
168
The SEC alleged that the defendants had used the Internet as a
means of manipulating the market. 169 Postings concerning SOE in
Internet message areas totaled over 10,000.170 "The SEC filed a total
of 32 civil lawsuits alleging market manipulation and five criminal
charges.''
In other instances, paid promoters not only withhold the fact that
they receive compensation, but misrepresent their independence,
track record, and research findings. 172 Notorious promoters have
gone as far as "scalping" the stock they are paid to hype, driving up
the market price with unfounded recommendations, and then selling
their own holdings at high prices for great profit. 173
In one recent case, the SEC sought an injunction against an
Internet newsletter called The Future Superstock ("FSS") for alleged
violations of section 17(a) of the Act and Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act and Rule lOb-5 thereunder.174 FSS recommended to
more than 100,000 subscribers approximately twenty-five micro cap
stocks that FSS predicted would double or triple in price over the
next three to twelve months. 175 "In most instances, the prices of
166. See id.
167. Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 843.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Business Center (CNBC television broadcast, July 13, 1998).
172. For example, the author of SGA Goldstar's on-line "Whisper Stocks"
newsletter was sentenced to federal prison after accepting bribes to tout the
stock of Systems of Excellence, Inc. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 15237,
Jan. 31, 1997, (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/
lrl5237.txt>.
173. See Scams, supra note 159.
174. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 15958, Oct. 27, 1998 (visited Mar. 4,
1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/Irl5958.txt>.
175. See id.
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recommended securities increased for a short period of time after a
recommendation was made in [FSS], after which the prices of those
stocks dropped substantially."'
76
FSS writer, Bruss, failed to disclose that he routinely sold shares
in the issuers he profiled after recommending the public buy the
shares; moreover, Bruss made false and misleading statements re-
garding the success of his past stock picks and falsely represented
that he performed research and analysis of issuers profiled.177
As a result of the manipulative activities of such on-line news-
letters, the SEC now offers investors on-line tips for assessing the
credibility of investment newsletters.1
78
2. On-line bulletin boards and chat rooms
Whether Usenet newsgroups 179 or Web-based discussion fo-
rums,180 on-line bulletin boards are also quickly becoming a popular
forum for sharing investment information.'18  Generally consisting of
"threads" of messages concerning numerous different opportunities,
manipulators often hype a company by purporting to reveal inside in-
formation about its upcoming announcements, new products, or lu-
crative contracts.182 By using the anonymizing tools discussed above
or hiding their identities through aliases, manipulators can theoreti-
cally create an illusion of widespread interest in a particular stock.
Also, a user claiming to be unbiased observer who has carefully
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See Tips, supra note 156. For an example of a site entirely devoted to
cautioning investors, see Stock Detective (visited Feb. 16, 1999)
<http://www.stockdetective.com>.
179. Usenet is a distributed system of messages (called postings) that are di-
vided into topical newsgroups. See YOUNG, supra note 8, at 278. Accessible
through the Internet, Usenet is a system of thousands of newsgroups which al-
lows users to exchange information on a huge variety of topics. See id. Es-
sentially, users can read a newsgroup's posting, reply to it, and/or post a new
message. See id.
180. Web discussion boards, or forums, function like Usenet newsgroups.
See id. at 350. Generally, such forums do not require special software; how-
ever, registration with the board operator, which would require disclosure of
the user's name and e-mail address, may be necessary before a user can post
messages. See id.
181. See Scams, supra note 159.
182. See id.
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researched a company may turn out to be a company insider, share-
holder, or paid promoter.
Chat rooms, 183 Web-based discussion forums, newsgroups, and
other news forums sponsored by on-line service providers are new
breeding grounds for users to engage in conversation focused on
small stocks that evade much attention from securities analysts.
184
Statements posted on the Internet in such forums can range from
mere opinions to subjective predictions and other unsubstantiated
rumors-perhaps purporting to have been confinmed by the com-
pany-to deliberately fabricated lies.'8 5 The most common practice
involves posting several messages in rapid succession, all repeating
the same "prediction."'186 Whether prearranged or sent by the same
person using different aliases, the key point is that the statements are
made anonymously, or worse, by investors masking their true identi-
ties. 187 The result is an epidemic of false information spreading like
wild fire through chat rooms. Consequently, stock prices rise and
fall in an increasingly volatile market.
188
183. Commonly referred to as "chatting," individuals on the Internet can en-
gage in "real time" dialogue. In its simplest form, "chat"
allows one-to-one communications and "Internet Relay Chat" (or IRC)
allows two or more [users] to type messages to each other that almost
immediately appear on the others' computer screens. IRC is analo-
gous to a telephone party line, using a computer and keyboard rather
than a telephone. With IRC, however, at any one time there are thou-
sands of different party lines available, in which collectively tens of
thousands of users are engaging in conversations on a huge range of
subjects .... In addition, commercial online services such as America
Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy have their
own "chat" systems ....
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aftd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997) (explaining Internet Relay Chat and other types of chat). See generally
YOUNG, supra note 8, at 323-62.
184. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1223.
185. See id. Typically, when the information posted is revealed as having
been inaccurate, the potential liability of the person who posted the message,
the issuer to which the message referred, and the Internet service providers be-
come immediate concerns. Generally, ISPs are not liable for messages posted
by their customers. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2877 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1223-24.
188. See Schroeder, supra note 23.
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America Online's The Motley Fool 189 discussion forum posts
message boards that have seen the most notorious instances of mar-
ket reaction to information posted on the Internet. 190 For example, in
1996, the stock of Diana Corporation was propelled on roller-coaster
price swings through postings on the Motley Fool message boards.1
9'
Coined the "darling of the Motley Fool on-line chat room,"' 92 Diana
Corporation's shares went from under $10 to nearly $115 each in one
year amid a combination of speculation and unsubstantiated hype.19
3
Then, on May 30, 1996, someone posted a message seeking
"anyone willing to 'cooperate with an inquiry into possible violations
of federal laws by [Diana Corporation insiders or affiliates] using the
Internet for stock manipulation purposes." ' 194 The message said to
contact Judy Gilbert of the Stock Exchange Commission's investiga-
tive division. 195 Such a commission does not even exist. Regardless,
the stock spiraled downward as a result of the posting.'19 By March
6, 1997, the shares were down to 6 and 1/8 in trading. 197 Evidently,
Internet users had opinions about Diana Corporation and they were
"partly, perhaps largely, responsible for the volatility of its stock
price. ' 19 What remains unclear is who posted the anonymous mes-
sage. The company's chairman and chief executive officer said nei-
ther he nor any of the company's employees had posted any such
message on the Internet.
199
189. See The Motley Fool (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http:llwww.fool.com/
index.htm>. See E.S. Browning, Is It Still a Stock Market, or Just a Launch
Pad?, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1996, at C1, for a personal account of an investor
who spends 90 minutes a day checking bulletin boards and chat rooms.
190. See Richard Gibson and Drew Ward, Cyberspace War Rages Over Di-
ana Corp. 's Technology, WALL ST. J., July 1, 1996, at B4.
191. See id. (noting that, in just one week, the stock of Diana Corporation
plunged $17.375, or 30%, when just six weeks earlier it had risen to $120 per
share).
192. Larry Bauman, Small Stock Focus, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1997, at C7.
193. See id.
194. Gibson & Ward, supra note 190.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See Bauman, supra note 192.
198. Gibson & Ward, supra note 190.
199. See id.
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Other chat rooms are also quickly gaining notoriety.2°° For ex-
ample, participants on trading-places.net, 20 1 a chat room for day trad-
ers, routinely engage in touting stocks. The following events, which
transpired on March 1, 1999, are illustrative of what is becoming
quite commonplace on the Internet.
An onslaught of messages about CNET, a San Francisco com-
pany which operates a computer information network on the Web,
began in the morning when the stock was trading on NASDAQ in the
low 120s.20 2 For hours, "more than 200 messages, sometimes sev-
eral a minute, poured forth extolling CNET.' 2 °3 The hype snow-
balled as chat room participants who owned the stock predicted that
the stock would soon ,fly,,.204 One message from "skibum" claimed
that CNET had been more profitable that Yahoo! during the past
quarter.20 5 This message was followed by others claiming CNET "IS
A MONSTER CALL!!!" and an "easy 140. "206 By 11:38 a.m., the
stock was up more than $23 per share for the day.207 By the end of
the day, trading volume equaled more than twice the number of
freely tradable shares and posted a 15 point gain.208 Unbelievably,
all of this happened on a day when the company did not announce
any news.20 9 A transcript of the day's trading shows "a remarkable
correlation between the movements of CNET's stock and countless
brief, often breathless messages posted on the chat room."
210
200. Other services similar to trading-places.net are Day Traders On-Line,
Pristine Trader and the Underground Trader. These services are "live," unlike
"the first generation of on-line newsletters which published a plain-vanilla list
of stock picks once or twice a day." Susan Pulliam & Rebecca Buckman,
Talking It Up: 'Winner Alert: CNET'" 'Its Gonna Fly Soon' 'CNET Is a Mon-
ster!!!', WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1999, at Al.
201. See trading-places.net (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http://www.trading-
places.net>.
202. See Pulliam & Buckman, supra note 200, at Al.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Id. CNET is by no means the exclusive beneficiary of the touting that
occurs in the trading-places.net chat room. One day in January, 1999, Imagi-
nOn, rumored to be in negotiations with America Online, was subject to the
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What is most striking about the day's events is the fact that
"skibum" is not an anonymous participant but John Jordan, part
owner of the trading-places.net chat room.21 1 The owners claim that
all they do for their subscribers is provide "a spark for a stock that is
ready to run.',212 Jordan naturally maintains that there is no conflict
of interest because of his practice of "always 'post[ing] the call' be-
fore buying shares."
213
Whether this is, or should be, considered market manipulation
remains a "perplexing" question.214 Of such chat room activity,
David Levine of the SEC noted: "The conduct certainly raises an
eyebrow and would require some scrutiny."215 Furthermore, whether
the chat room could be considered an investment adviser required to
register with the SEC also seems worthy of consideration.
216
Clearly, the owners of trading-places.net are in the business of rec-
ommending certain stocks; they have hundreds of subscribers who
pay $279.95 a month to be privy to the "trade alerts" and "winner
alerts" they post.
217
The sudden surge in the price and trading volume of Comparator
Systems Corporation ("Comparator") in May 1996, serves as a prime
example of on-line market manipulation.218 This small company,
listed for trading on NASDAQ's Small Cap Market, was suddenly
rumored to have developed a fingerprint recognition system which
could be incorporated into a credit card.219 One widely circulated
rumor on the Motley Fool chat room suggested that MasterCard
would soon adopt the technology. 220 Almost overnight, the stock
soared 30-fold from $.03 per share to over $1.75 per share, an
chat room's "recommendation." See id. Its stock rose from $9 to $15 per
share, an increase of 66 %. See id. When the rumor was denied the following
day, the stock plunged back to $9. See id. On April 2, 1999, the stock closed
at $4.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1224.
219. See id.
220. See id.
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increase in aggregate market capitalization from $36 million to over
$1 billion.221 On a single day, more than 178 million shares of Com-
parator stock traded on NASDAQ, breaking the all-time single day
volume record for NASDAQ.222 Ultimately, it was discovered that
the technology had been stolen from British researchers and that
there was no basis for the MasterCard rumor.223 Consequently, the
stock price plummeted and Comparator entered bankruptcy that
year.224 Unfortunately, neither the SEC nor the NASD has regula-
tory authority over ordinary investors who post anonymous messages
in chat rooms.225 Moreover, detecting whether broker-dealers or
company insiders are behind the rumors seems to pose a difficult
evidentiary task.
Clearly not too difficult, however. The SEC ordered the suspen-
sion of trading in Comparator securities from May 14, 1996, to May
28, 1996, because of "questions raised as to the adequacy and accu-
racy of publicly-disseminated information about Comparator."22 6 On
May 31, 1996, the SEC filed suit against Comparator and three offi-
cers for alleged violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act and
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5.227 The complaint
alleged that the defendants sold tens of millions of shares while ma-
terially misrepresenting the financial status of Comparator and its
proprietary interest in the fingerprint identification technology.
228
Soon after, in June 1996, the stock was delisted from NASDAQ.229
On September 16, 1996, the court entered final judgments against
Comparator and the individual defendants for violating the anti-
fraud, reporting, and books and records provisions of the securities
laws. 230 Last year, the judge entered supplemental judgments against
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. SEC, Exchange Act Release No. 37,209, May 14, 1996 (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/adminact/3437209.txt>.
227. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 14927, May 31, 1996 (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr14927.txt>.
228. See id.
229. See Michael Schroeder, Three Ex-Officers of Comparator Get More
Penalties, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1998, at B5.
230. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 15056, Sept. 19, 1996 (visited Feb. 16,
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the three officers, ordering them to disgorge hundreds of thousands
of dollars in salary and profits from the sale of Comparator stock.23 1
The Comparator scandal prompted the NASD to conduct an in-
formal study of other stocks that had experienced similar dramatic
increases in stock price and volume.232 The NASD found "a close
correlation between [those increases] and Internet postings. ' 33
The most recent and elaborate example of possible market ma-
nipulation involved the stock of a technology company traded on
NASDAQ, PairGain.234 On April 7, 1999, the company's stock in-
creased 31 percent after an unknown perpetrator posted a message on
Yahoo's financial bulletin board falsely claiming that ECI Telecom
would acquire PairGain for $1.35 billion.235 Presumably, the goal
was to increase the stock price in order to dump shares at a higher
price.23 6 The manipulator used Angelfire, a Lycos subsidiary which
provides free Web space, to create a page which looked virtually
identical to a page from the Bloomberg News site,237 complete with
the site's logos, images, and fonts.238 Then the anonymous message
was posted to the bulletin board with a link to the forged site. The
stock soared as high as $11.13 on the false report, and then fell to
$9.38 after the scam was uncovered and executives from both com-
panies vehemently denied any involvement. This occurrence may be
the most sophisticated example yet of how ordinary people are de-
frauding investors through use of the Internet. In other cases, false
messages are posted on bulletin boards or in chat rooms and the scam
is complete. Here, a false message was posted only to lure investors
1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr15056.txt>.
231. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 15855, Aug. 20, 1998 (visited Feb. 16,
1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/r15855.xt>.
232. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1224.
233. Id. (quoting Therese Poletti, Internet Stock Tips Pose Free Speech Di-
lemma, RUETER BUS. REP., June 11, 1996 (quoting Marc Beauchamp of the
NASD)).
234. See Gaw, supra note 133.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See Bloomberg News (visited Apr. 10, 1999)
<http://www.bloomberg.com/welcome.html>. Bloomberg LP filed a lawsuit
as a result of this hoax for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
other civil infractions. See Bloomberg Files Suit Against 5 "John Does" in
PairGain Net Hoax, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1999, at B5.
238. See Gaw, supra note 133.
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to the real deceptive device-a "masterful" replica of the Bloomberg
site; this incident suggests a whole new opportunity for manipula-
tors-completely copying Web sites.
2 39
As expected, Lycos would not reveal the identity of the person
listed as the creator of the page because of its privacy policy and
suggested that the perpetrator had probably used a false name.2 40 It
is the policy of Lycos and Yahoo! to reveal such information only
when compelled to do so by court order.241 These events spurred
disagreement as to whether regulators would be able to locate the
perpetrator.2 42 SEC officials contended that they could find people
who use anonymous screen names by using "everything from sub-
poenas to old-fashioned gumshoe work."243 On the other hand, some
security experts say a "smart" scam artist would be nearly untouch-
able if, for example, the person would use a stolen credit card to es-
tablish an e-mail account. 244 Likewise, a person who uses a com-
puter at a public library, cyber caf6, or college computer center may
easily hide their trail.245
It seems that the perpetrator of this crime was not smart enough.
A twenty-five year old North Carolina employee of PairGain was ar-
rested less than a week after he consummated the elaborate fraud;
surprisingly, "he left a trail that was remarkably easy to follow."
2 46
Interestingly, though, authorities did not allege any PairGain trading
by the defendant, Gary Hoke, a midlevel development engineer 2 47
Investigators traced the identity of the Yahoo! message poster to
Hoke because he used an e-mail address on Microsoft Corporation's
239. See Mark Maremont, Extra! Extra! Internet Hoax, Get the Details,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at Cl.
240. See id.
241. See Mark Maremont & William M. Bulkeley, Who Did the Hoax? SEC
Answers A Day After PairGain's Stock Rockets, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 9, 1999, at
B5.
242. See id.
243. Id. (quoting John Reed Stark, chief of the Office of Internet Enforce-
ment).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. William M. Bulkeley, Arrest Made In PairGain Internet Hoax, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 16, 1999, at Cl.
247. See id. at C11.
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free HotMail service; that same address was used to set up an ac-
count on the Angelfire service where the fictitious page was
posted.248
What is most notable about the PairGain hoax is that, unlike
other manipulations of the recent past, PairGain is not a micro cap.
The investing public holds 52.8 million shares and nearly two mil-
lion shares trade hands daily.249 Nevertheless, its stock seems just as
easy to manipulate.
This criticism is not to imply that bulletin boards have no value.
On the contrary, especially for small investors who have limited eco-
nomic and informational resources, bulletin boards offer access to
valuable information previously reserved for investors who could af-
ford a patient and attentive broker. Investors who make decisions
based on information they gather on the Internet must beware of the
potential for disaster.
3. Spamming
Spain, or unsolicited commercial e-mail, is a cost-effective and
easy way to communicate with a large number of Internet users. 50
A user receives spam from a sender who has obtained the user's e-
mail address from a mailing list, newsgroup, or directly from the user
on a Web site.251 A user's e-mail address may also be on a list com-
mercially available to spanmers.2 52 As a result, manipulators can
use sparn to reach prospective investors for shady investment
schemes or to spread false information about a company. Spain al-
lows the unscrupulous to target many more potential investors than
through cold calling or mass mailing. Using readily available spam
programs, the aspiring manipulator can send personalized messages
to thousands, even millions, of Internet users.253 The practice has
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See YOUNG, supra note 8, at 173-75.
251. See id. at 173.
252. See id.
253. Spam has become a major problem on the Internet. To counter the
large volume of spain promising get-rich-quick schemes, one site offers a pos-
sible solution-Spain Hater. It is free, Windows-based software that is avail-
able on-line. It automatically responds to spam with an e-mail message to the
sender. See Hit Back at the Spammers! (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
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become so bothersome that California has passed a law prohibiting
any person or entity conducting business in the state from e-mailing
unsolicited advertising materials without providing a return e-mail
address. 25 4 Despite such laws, users are still bombarded with spain
offering get-rich-quick schemes.
In October 1998, the SEC filed a complaint against an Internet
stock touting service, Stockstowatch.com, Inc. ("STW"), and its
president, Steven King, for alleged violations of the antitouting and
antifraud provisions of the Act by touting and scalping shares of five
publicly traded micro cap companies.2 5  In exchange for shares of
the companies, the service touted the stocks in e-mail sent to STW's
200,000 subscribers.2 5 6 For example, STW sent spain promoting
Surgical Safety Products claiming that "[the stock] will be a $20
stock within 18 months. ' 257 The stock price surged from 96 cents to
$3.13 upon dissemination of the recommendation, a 200% in-
crease.258 The defendants sold their shares while recommending that
investors buy shares; in essence, they scalped their securities and
reaped a $573,753 profit.
259
Having succeeded, the defendants committed the same crime
again on May 23, 1998; this time STW profiled Midland, Inc. 260 In
its e-mails, STW stated that Midland "can become a $75 stock" be-
cause of "its ability to generate long term growth.",261 The stock
price increased the next day from $1.03 to $2.63 before closing at
$1.44; trading volume had increased over 100 percent.262 Again, the
defendants scalped shares they received from the company and for a
gain of $172,000.263 The scalping is alleged to have violated
<http://www.cix.co.uk/-net-services/spam/spamhater.htm>. Another pro-
gram, Spamicide, moves spam to a trash folder and allows the user access only
to the user's "real" e-mail. See Spamicide (visited Feb. 17, 1999)
<http://www.cix.co.uk/-net-services/spam>.
254. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
255. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 15956, Oct. 27, 1998 (visited Mar. 4,
1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lrl5956.txt>.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
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sections 17(a) and 10(b) of the Exchange Act; moreover, the failure
to disclose to prospective investors that the defendants received
shares as compensation violated section 17(b) of the Act.264 All in
all, STW and King derived a profit of more than one million dollars
from scalping micro cap shares. The inapplicability of section 9 ren-
ders the general antifraud provisions the only applicable law to the
situation.
The most notorious massive spain campaign to promote stocks
involved Francis Tribble and his public relations firm, Sloane Fitz-
gerald.265 The complaint alleged that Tribble and Sloane Fitzgerald
touted two micro cap stocks, Eventemp Corporation and JT Restau-
rants, Inc., without disclosing the fact, nature, and amount of consid-
eration received in violation of section 17(b) of the Act.266 During
the period between November 1997, and August 1998, Tribble dis-
seminated more than six million e-mail spams to tout the potential
earning power of the micro cap stocks.267 Many of the e-mails "pur-
ported to be from independent stock promoters such as 'HotStock,'
'Net-Vest,' and 'Cyber-Stock,' which were actually only names
Tribble invented., 268 Moreover, spams referred recipients to other
sites Tribble had created to recommend the stocks. Then in August
1998, Tribble wrote an on-line newsletter touting JT Restaurants and
sent it to 200 subscribers whom he had solicited through previous
spains and site visits.269 Having received stock and cash for his
touting efforts, Tribble had a vested interest in an increase in the
stock price.
The SEC filed a civil action against Tribble and his company for
violating section 17(b) of the Act; the defendants consented to be
enjoined from any further violations of the section and agreed to pay
a $15,000 penalty.271 It is arguable whether this punishment is ade-
quate for a man whose spam campaign was the subject of the largest
264. See id.
265. See SEC, Litigation Release No. 15959, Oct. 27, 1998 (visited Mar. 4,
1999) <http://www.see.gov/enforce/litigrel/lrl5959.txt>.
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. See id.
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number of complaints ever received in the history, albeit a short one,
of the agency's Enforcement Complaint Center.
271
C. The SEC's Response to On-line Securities Violations
The purpose of the SEC is to regulate the securities markets to
ensure, "to the extent practicable, that the markets are fair, open effi-
cient, transparent, orderly and competitive.,, 272 The agency accom-
plishes this goal through regulation and supervision of broker-
dealers, the exchanges, clearing agencies, transfer agents, and secu-
rities information processors.273 Prior to the advent of the Internet,
the SEC's enforcement division had never experienced such a "rapid
and extreme transformation" of its rules of engagement.27 4 Conse-
quently, the application of existent federal securities law to the Inter-
net remains relatively undeveloped.275
"Since 1995, the SEC has initiated [sixty-six] enforcement ac-
tions against alleged perpetrators of Internet securities fraud."276 By
February 1999, thirty-two of the sixty-six cases had largely been
concluded; defendants generally were required to either pay civil
penalties and/or refrain from further securities law violations.2 7 7 De-
spite the seemingly light punishment for on-line market manipulation
or fraud, in two of the thirty-two cases, state or federal prosecutors
obtained criminal convictions or prison sentences for seven individ-
ual defendants.
278
271. See id.
272. SEC Report, supra note 45.
273. See id.
274. Stark, supra note 136, at 10.
275. This paper addresses the antimanipulation and antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws; however, state securities laws, commonly known as
"blue sky laws," and state criminal laws may also cover securities fraud on the
Internet. For example, a California man was recently convicted on 53 state
criminal counts and was handed a harsh, ten year sentence after being charged
with grand theft, the sale of unregistered securities and fraud in connection
with an Internet stock offering. See Rebecca Buckman, California Man Gets
10 Years in Jail For Securities Fraud on Internet, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1998,
at B2. Nearly half of all state regulatory agencies have established specific
programs to combat Internet frauds that violate state securities laws. See GAO
Testimony, supra note 21, at 13.
276. GAO Testimony, supra note 21, at 13.
277. See id.
278. See id.
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Moreover, computer technology shows no indication of slowing
down; indeed, the United States has recently committed to support a
world-wide expansion of the Internet. 279 As a result, use of on-line
communications to perpetrate market manipulations will remain a
constant and increasingly pressing concern.
Despite the societal and economic changes the Internet has ef-
fected thus far, the SEC has sought no new statutes, regulations, or
rules to protect investors from becoming victims of crime committed
over the Internet.280 The SEC has no intention to seek new enforce-
ment statutes, regulations, or remedies to detect and prosecute secu-
rities fraud on the Internet.28' "The same case law ... applies
whether the activity is done by carrier pigeon or the Internet. 282
Moreover, the agency maintains that congressional intervention is
unnecessary and that the present antifraud weapons will more than
suffice.283 The agency maintains that current laws are sufficiently
flexible to apply to securities violations perpetrated over the Internet;
only the application of the laws must evolve.
284
In 1997, the SEC was adamant that the agency did not need
anything more than it already had in its arsenal to combat market
manipulation.2 8 More recently however, in the summer of 1998, the
SEC established the Office of Internet Enforcement ("OIE") specifi-
cally to address the high number of securities violations perpetrated
on the Internet.286 The specialized unit, headed by John Reed Stark,
was formed in response to the more than thirty cases already brought
279. See Jeanne Cummings, Gore to Outline Guide to Growth for the Inter-
net, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1998, at A4.
280. See Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 835.
281. See id. at 817.
282. Karen Alexander, Anti-Fraud Sweep Highlights Online Oversight, But
Can Agency Police Cyberspace's Vast Reaches?, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998,
at 15 (quoting SEC Commissioner Paul Carey).
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. The SEC's Division of Enforcement commonly investigates market
fluctuations in particular stocks which "do not appear to result from general
market trends or from known developments affecting the issuing company."
SEC Division of Enforcement Complaint Center (visited Feb. 13, 1999)
<http://www.sec.gov/enforce/comctr.htm>.
286. See SEC NEws DIGEST, Issue 98-144, July 28, 1998.
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by the summer of 1998 involving securities fraud on the Internet.
287
Cases thus far have involved "virtually every type of investment
scam, including phony offerings, market manipulations, affinity
frauds (e.g., frauds that target a particular ethnic or religious group),
and pyramid and ponzi schemes. 288
The OIE coordinates the SEC's response to the increasing re-
ports of on-line securities fraud.289 OIE is primarily responsible for
developing policies and procedures for Internet surveillance, man-
aging e-mail complaints, and providing guidance for conducting
Internet fraud investigations. 290 Only three full-time staff members
work for OIE but it has over 125 on its volunteer staff roster in SEC
offices nationwide who spend a couple of hours weekly identifying
potential securities violations on the Internet.
291
In the summer of 1998, the SEC's on-line Enforcement Com-
plaint Center received an average of more than 120 complaints every
day regarding potential securities violations.292 By March 1999, the
number of daily fraud tips had risen to 300.293 Because there are no
comprehensive statistics available on the actual incidence of securi-
ties violations committed over the Internet, the increase in the num-
ber of complaints received by the SEC is the only reliable indicator
of the possible severity of the emerging problem. Note, however,
that the complaints indicate only the number of investors who sus-
pect that they have been defrauded.
The SEC employs the following multi-faceted approach to battle
securities violations on the Internet. First, the SEC has increased
surveillance by assigning staff members to monitor the Internet.294
Second, the SEC promises to aggressively investigate and prosecute
securities fraud on the Internet.295 Third, the SEC embraces self-
policing by encouraging users to report dubious offerings or
287. See id.
288. Id.
289. See GAO Testimony, supra note 21, at 9.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. See Schroeder, supra note 23.
294. See Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 836.
295. See id. at 837-44.
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suspicious postings to the on-line Enforcement Complaint Center,
296
which began operation in June 1996.297 Fourth, the SEC views edu-
cation as a critical aspect of the program298 and frequently publishes
literature to help Internet investors ensure against becoming the next
victim of fraud.
Finally, the SEC engages in both formal and informal liaison
work with the Federal Trade Commission, the U.S. Department of
Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Com-
munications Commission.300  In December 1996, the SEC joined
forces with three other federal agencies and local law enforcement
from twenty-four states for "Surf Day," which resulted in identifying
more than 500 possible Internet scams.3 11 Furthermore, the SEC
works closely with the NYSE, the NASD, and other self-regulatory
organizations in order to combat securities law violations on the
Internet.30 2 In November 1998, "Investment Opportunity Surf Day"
resulted in finding dozens of potential consumer financial frauds
among over 400 sites. Incidentally, regulators send warning mes-
sages to the sites and normally do not take enforcement action on the
basis of surf day findings.
30 3
Combating securities law violations on the Internet does not
comport with traditional concepts of the federal securities laws.
304
Nevertheless, the SEC is commendably prosecuting most Internet
manipulation and fraud cases using section 10(b). In most cases dis-
cussed above, the defendant was the company and/or its corporate
insiders or affiliates. Clearly, problems will arise where the alleged
manipulator remains anonymous and beyond the law's reach. Un-
fortunately, neither the SEC nor the NASD have regulatory authority
296. See SEC Division of Enforcement Complaint Center (visited Feb. 13,
1999) <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/Cometr.htm>.
297. See GAO Testimony, supra note 21, at 6.
298. See Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 845-46.
299. See Investor Assistance and Complaints (visited Feb. 13, 1999)
<http://www.sec.gov/invkhome.htm>.
300. See Celia & Stark, supra note 29, at 846.
301. See id.
302. See id. at 846-47.
303. See id.
304. For example, the Securities Act of 1933 makes a basic distinction be-
tween "written" and "oral" communications. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
Internet postings do not seem to fit in either category.
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over ordinary investors who post anonymous statements in chat
rooms, and neither agency can easily detect if broker-dealers are be-
hind the rumors posted.
One problem presented is that the First Amendment may protect
the right to engage in anonymous speech.305 Where commercial
speech is at issue, as in the case of market manipulation, a far more
permissive standard would apply than that which would be applied to
political speech.30 6 That is, commercial speech receives only limited
First Amendment protection. However, anonymity is an alluring
characteristic of the Internet and suppressing it would be unwelcome.
Nevertheless, securities regulators need the ability to trace identities
of authors who have sent anonymous e-mails or posted information
in chat rooms on an after-the-fact basis.
307
A major obstacle to this effort is the rise of anonymous "remail-
ers," which conceal the user's identity and location.30 8 Typically, a
cooperating agent who remails the statement to the chat rooms is
needed to conceal the sender's identity. Potentially, such an agent
could be considered an alder and abetter of a securities law viola-
tion.30 9 The problem with this approach is that the aider may not
have the requisite intent if he or she did not know that the statement
was false or fraudulent. It should be noted, however, that new sec-
tion 20(f) of the Exchange Act requires only that the defendant
knowingly provide substantial assistance to another person.
310
Clearly, because of the difficulty in tracing Internet communi-
cations, the Internet creates unique challenges to regulators attempt-
ing to collect evidence. As is evident from the Internet cases dis-
cussed previously, there is "a particular danger in deception on
Internet message boards and chat rooms, where anonymity can be a
particularly vexing problem.",311  Interestingly, only one of the
305. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (holding a city ordinance prohibiting
the distribution of anonymous handbills unconstitutional).
306. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343-44, 348-51.
307. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1225.
308. See A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity andIts Enmities, 1995 J. ONLINE
L. art. 4, 20-25.
309. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994).
310. See id. § 78t(f) (1994).
311. Jason Anders & Carrie Lee, SEC Actions Underscore the Dangers But
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forty-four SEC actions brought in the Internet cases "dealt exclu-
sively with the use of message boards to promote stocks."
312
This matter is further complicated by the fact that the Internet
crosses jurisdictional lines and the laws and regulations relating to
data preservation vary by country. Assuming senders and recipients
can be identified, the challenge for regulators may be as fundamental
as not knowing whether to obtain the relevant evidence from the ac-
cess provider, the subscriber service, or the parties to the communi-
cation itself.313 Moreover, the extent to which regulators can compel
data from those who maintain it, such as third party subscriber serv-
ices, may not be settled in many jurisdictions.
The method of information dissemination may also be a critical
factor in prosecuting manipulators. Those who publish articles or
periodicals on the Internet are more likely to be caught because vic-
tims may have printed out the information. On the other hand, per-
petrators who tout stock in a chat room or through e-mail benefit
from both the lack of regulation in those domains and the lack of pa-
per trails. 314 The absence of archives on the Internet also presents an
evidentiary nightmare.
According to a new study commissioned by the Senate investi-
gations panel, "rapid growth in online securities scams 'could ulti-
mately place a significant burden on the regulators' investigative-
staff resources and limit the agencies' capacity to respond effec-
tively. 315 The study predicts that regulators do not have adequate
human and technological resources to coordinate policing activi-
ties.
3 16
Won't Safeguard Online Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1998, at A25E (quot-
ing John Coffee, a Columbia University Law School professor).
312. Id.
313. See International Organization of Securities Commissions, supra note
132, at 229.
314. See Will Morrow, Is the Internet Participating in Securities Fraud?:
Harsh Realities in the Public Domain, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2203, 2209 (1998).
315. Schroeder, supra note 23.
316. See id.
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V. PROPOSALS FOR EFFECTIVELY COMBATING ON-LINE MARKET
MANIPULATION
One possible resolution to the increasing securities violations
being perpetrated over the Internet would be to prosecute the opera-
tor of the chat room. Those who sponsor and monitor chat rooms
and newsgroups focused on securities valuation topics ought to be
"gatekeepers" charged with and subject to obligations to combat
Internet fraud.317 Such a recommendation would require enactment
of new legislation. While theoretically sound, this suggestion may
be unrealistic. Nevertheless, the result of such a suggestion would
"throw sand in the gears that connect global markets."
318
Most chat rooms have private sponsors who limit access to sub-
scribers. Some pressure could be levied on the on-line service pro-
viders to delete comments that come from anonymous remailers.
Providers already monitor chat rooms to delete obscenity; an addi-
tional monitoring requirement may not be too burdensome. How-
ever, providers are not legally obligated to do so.
3 19
The SEC clearly has authority over the broker-dealer industry.
Undoubtedly, broker-dealers must disclose their own identities, but
the question here revolves around vicarious liability for the commu-
nications of others.320  The NASD prohibits broker-dealers from
linking to Web sites that the member knows to contain misleading
information about the member's products or services. Arguably, this
rule could be extended to preclude linking to sites on which anony-
mous and non-traceable communications are prevalent.
It seems apparent that finding an entity that can be easily per-
suaded or pressured into taking on the responsibility of monitoring
the content or traceability of postings on the Internet will be difficult.
For example, the Silicon Investor has said that it "can't possibly po-
lice the thousands of messages that whiz by on its system each
317. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1232.
318. Id.
319. Pursuant to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, providers are
not treated as the publishers or speakers of information provided by another
person. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1994).
320. See Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,353, at 77,768 (Nov. 27, 1996).
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day."321 Instead, Silicon Investor relies on the SEC to protect inves-
tors. Until there is such a gatekeeper, the anarchic culture of the
Internet will insist that it remain beyond the reach of the law's arm.
Recently, the Wall Street Journal quoted a statement made by
SEC Enforcement Chief Walker: "[t]he Internet isn't impossible to
police."322 Indeed, proverbial wisdom tells us that nothing is impos-
sible. However, the emergence of the Internet has also introduced
new justifications for both new enforcement measures and/or some
form of legislative enactment which would provide a realistic and
workable scheme to combat on-line market manipulation.
As the Internet continues to grow, Congress must grant addi-
tional authority to regulators so that the agencies may promulgate
rules specifically prohibiting market manipulation effected through
the use of the Internet. The legislature must balance the benefits of
the Internet with the need to protect innocent investors and the mar-
ket from manipulation. Revamping the current statutory framework
would behoove the SEC in its attempt to target on-line market ma-
nipulation, especially of smaller companies' stock. Allowing ma-
nipulators to distort market prices without a credible threat of prose-
cution disparages the public policies upon which our federal
securities laws are based.
In addition to legislative measures, better investor education is
necessary. With every day that passes, concerns about the increasing
potential for market manipulation are mounting. "Never, ever make
an investment based solely on what you read in an online newsletter
of Internet bulletin board, especially if the investment involves a
small, thinly-traded company that isn't well known," said Nancy M.
Smith, Director of the SEC's Office of Investor Education and As-
sistance.323 "Assume that the information about these companies is
not trustworthy unless you can prove otherwise through your own
independent research.
' 324
321. Anders & Lee, supranote 311, at A25E.
322. Schroeder & Buckman, supra note 147, at C1.
323. SEC Charges 44 Stock Promoters in First Internet Securities Fraud
Sweep (visited Mar. 4, 1999) <http://www.sec.gov/news/netfraud.htm>.
324. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Securities trading is nothing new. In the 1 l00s, ownership
shares in French textile mills were traded;3 25 in 1531, the first stock
exchange was established in Antwerp, Belgium.326 The NYSE, now
the world's largest exchange in trading volume, was founded in
1792.327 As trading methods and resources developed, exchanges
began disseminating price data on a broader range of companies to a
wider range of people.328 Suddenly, the importance of timely and
accurate information became apparent. Consequently, "access to in-
formation led, inevitably, to efforts to manipulate markets., 329 In
1719, satirist and avid investor Jonathan Swift criticized traders for
"'coining false news"' and "'whispering imaginary terrors, frights,
hopes [and] expectations.
''330
In 1999, mouse clicks have succeeded whispers. Modem in-
vestors have changed the face of the securities markets by using the
Internet to seek and discuss investment opportunities. Technological
advances have allowed participation in the securities markets to be-
come more affordable, time efficient, and accessible to a growing
audience of prospective investors. Although theory dictates the
benefits of greater informational access, practice suggests that tech-
nology facilitates market manipulation by providing a new medium
for disseminating false or inaccurate information.
In time, the federal securities laws must evolve to incorporate
prohibitions against specific crimes perpetrated on the Internet. Oth-
erwise, market integrity will fall victim to the disturbing trend to-
ward on-line market manipulation. In a new world where the securi-
ties markets are increasingly moved by ordinary people clicking a
mouse, the law must adapt to address the burgeoning use of technol-
ogy to commit market manipulation. Simply attempting to apply old
law to new and sophisticated crimes will not suffice for long, despite
regulatory officials' adamant statements to the contrary.
325. See McGee, supra note 3, at S1 1.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
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The SEC is using every possible tool to repair the problems cre-
ated by on-line market manipulation as they arise. Perhaps the
agency's commendable responsiveness is adequate at present. Ulti-
mately though, the SEC will realize that its tool kit does not contain
satisfactory instruments capable of preventing, surveying, discover-
ing, or repairing substantial damage caused by an inevitable increase
in on-line fraud and market manipulation. It would be naYve to be-
lieve the SEC could somehow outrun these new-world bandits who
"get away" through the use of Internet technology; however, keeping
pace with on-line market manipulation must become an attainable
goal in order to protect the integrity of the securities markets.
Nancy Toross*
* I would like to thank the inspirational Professor Therese Maynard for
her insight and guidance not only in bringing this Comment to print but
throughout law school. I wish to thank the members of the Loyola of Los An-
geles Law Review for their tireless editorial efforts. I would also like to thank
my staunch champion, Narbeh, for his love and continuous support. This
Comment is dedicated to my family, Zachary, Mara, and Derek, in recognition
of a lifetime of unconditional love and encouragement to which I owe all of
my achievements.
1446
